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Current research shows an unclear picture of the impact predictive policing has on 
decreasing crime rates. Surging police officers to high-crime “hot spots” does lead to 
some deterrence; however, the practice is unsustainable over a long period and has led to 
new methods such as the “repeat victimization” method. The regression discontinuity 
design used to examine crime rates before and after the implementation of the predictive 
policing model focused on seven felony crimes: murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, 
larceny, and vehicular larceny. The results were not uniform across the board with 
murder, rape, assault, and vehicular larceny showing statistically significant differences 
post-implementation while robbery, burglary, larceny, and total arrests did not show 
significant differences. The crime rates for murder, rape, assault, and vehicular larceny 
were all higher post-implementation than pre-implementation. Overall, the results in this 
study are muddled and additional research is required before determining whether the 
specific policies effectively result in lower crime.  
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In 2010, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance Jr. created the Crime 
Strategies Unit within his office. The Unit’s goal was to use technology to identify 
“crime drivers” or individuals who were at the root of crimes in given areas. By 
identifying and arresting these aforementioned individuals, the idea was that crime rates 
in the area would drop significantly. In order to carry out its mission, the Crime 
Strategies Unit built a database that initially had roughly 200 “crime drivers,” sourced by 
Assistant District Attorneys and police located around Manhattan. Unit Assistant District 
Attorneys receive alerts when someone in the system has been arrested and periodically 
interview arrestees to gain information and update their database on a weekly basis. The 
Unit then uses this data to find patterns and form connections between seemingly 
unrelated incidents.1  
Previously, using data to stop and prevent crimes has produced mixed results—
prompting questions regarding how well the strategy works. Myriad studies on the matter 
have used several different data analysis tools to attempt to stop crimes, including: 
geospatial hot-spotting, Repeat Victimization modeling, and Pulling Levers method. 
Although there are mixed results on the effects of predictive policing on lowering crime 
rates, District Attorney Cyrus Vance expected that, because the Unit’s methodology was 
taking the major “crime drivers” off the streets, crime rates would subsequently decrease 
because such individuals would be unable to commit crimes or induce others to commit 
crimes. 
                                                 
1 Chip Brown, “Cyrus Vance Jr.'s 'Moneyball' Approach to Crime,” The New York Times (The New York 
Times, December 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/magazine/cyrus-vance-jrs-moneyball-
approach-to-crime.html. 
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This study focuses on what the New York City Police Department classifies as 
“Seven Major Felony Offenses”: Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter, Rape, 
Robbery, Felony Assault, Burglary, Grand Larceny, and Grand Larceny of Motor 
Vehicle. Using data from 2000 to 2019, the felony crime data is analyzed to determine 
whether Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance’s approach of predictive policing and 
prosecution led to a downturn in felony crimes in Manhattan. Cyrus Vance took over the 
District Attorney’s office in 2010 and in order to give us appropriate time series to 
compare, the data from 2000-2010 has been compared to the data from 2011-2019. The 
analysis of the felony crime data, provided by the New York Police Department, shows 
that the felony crimes after Cyrus Vance implemented his Crime Strategies Unit had 
mixed results with the murder, rape, assault, and vehicular larceny arrests having 
significant increases in arrests post-implementation while the robbery, burglary, and 
larceny arrests did not have statistically significant change post-implementation.   
These findings were found by comparing the first 10 years of the data to the 
second 10 years of the data. The data was grouped this way to account for time prior to 
implementation and time after implementation. The data was tested to see if there was a 
significant difference between Group 1 (2000-2010) and Group 2 (2011-2019). The 
initial findings combined all felony crimes and found the Total Arrests did not have a 
statistically significant change post-implementation.   
 3 
2 Literature Review 
Predictive policing is the use of analytic methods – often statistical and 
mathematical – to identify patterns in crime statistics.2 Often, this is used to find crime 
“hotspots” or areas where crime is extremely prevalent relative to other areas. Utilizing 
these tools can be beneficial to police departments as they are stretched thin due to 
budget cuts from the current economic conditions.3 Predictive policing can allow 
leadership of departments efficiently make staffing decisions on where to have officers 
patrol during their shifts. In the past, policing has followed the model of: random patrol, 
rapid response, and reactive investigation. Post 9/11, intelligence became a crucial part of 
police work but for the most part did not include quantitative models of crime.4 Police 
departments have, for a long time, collected statistics as a way to determine progress in 
how they are doing year to year. But the statistics are mainly used in a retrospective 
capacity and not for any sort of predictive analytics.5  
Predictive analytics have been used by different parts of society for many 
different items such as supply chain issues. Large stores such as Walmart shift supplies 
                                                 
2 Walt L. Perry, “Predictive Policing: the Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations,” 
in Predictive Policing: the Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations (RAND 
Corporation, 2013). 
3 Charlie Beck and Colleen McCue, “Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn from Wal-Mart and 
Amazon about Fighting Crime in a Recession?,” Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn from Wal-Mart 




5 Elizabeth R Groff and Nancy G La Vigne, “Forecasting the Future of Predictive Crime Mapping,” Crime 
Prevention Studies 13 (2002): pp. 29-57. 
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around when there are large-scale weather events to allow for key items to be close by 
when the weather event occurs. The same logic applies to utilizing predictive analytics 
for police resource deployment. In 2003, a risk-based approach was used to deploy police 
officers on New Years Eve. This approach led to a decrease in complaints of random gun 
fire.6 Past research has yielded evidence that crime is predictable because criminals often 
commit crimes in areas where they feel comfortable. Criminals keep geographic and 
temporal schedules and comfort zones. Criminals keep routines and operate in times they 
know they have been able to commit a crime in the past and in an area where they have 
successfully committed a crime.7  
Not every predictive policing program has been a success however. In Shreveport, 
Louisiana, the police department utilized predictive policing techniques to try to identify 
areas where there would be at least one property crime in the next month. Officers would 
then be surged to these areas to maintain a presence. The study found no evidence that 
property crime was reduced in areas where the predictive policing techniques had 
identified at being high risk for property crimes and had increase police presence than 
areas which did not have an increased police presence.8 More success has been found in 
utilizing geospatial analysis to find crime “hot spots”. These are highly focused areas as 
                                                 
6 Ibid; Charlie Beck and Colleen McCue, “Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn from Wal-Mart and 
Amazon about Fighting Crime in a Recession?,” Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn from Wal-Mart 
and Amazon about Fighting Crime in a Recession? | Office of Justice Programs, March 13, 2014, 
https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/predictive-policing-what-can-we-learn-wal-mart-and-
amazon-about. 
7 Ibid; Walt L. Perry, “Predictive Policing: the Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement 
Operations,” in Predictive Policing: the Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement 
Operations (RAND Corporation, 2013). 
 
8 Priscillia Hunt, Jessica Saunders, and John S Hollywood, Evaluation of the Shreveport Predictive 
Policing Experiment(RAND Corporation, 2014). 
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small as street blocks where a disproportionate amount of crime is centralized. Many of 
these studies focus on crime deterrence by positioning police officers in the immediate 
area of crime hot spots but one study in Baltimore, Maryland focused on “informal social 
controls. This study collected data from surveys as well as observations taken found 
displays of “collective efficacy” in highly focused geographic areas.9  
Additionally, a study in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania studied similar geospatial 
analysis with a predictive element. This study worked to predict crime hotspots in one 
month blocks of time as this is a routine time period in police departments as they 
conduct monthly review meetings known as “Comp-Stat.”10 A variable that the 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania study incorporated in their model was the seasonality of the 
crimes. The seasonality focuses on the time of year where different crimes are 
committed.11 In the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania study, the police department focused on the 
six police precincts in the city. The results showed that there needs to be at least 30 
crimes per month in each police precinct to approach an acceptable accuracy for the 
model. Additionally, the study found that there was not much evidence of pattern changes 
when implementing force deployment to high crime areas as most of the variation in the 
data was due to randomness. Seasonality was also not large enough to attribute to specific 
peaks or dips in crime at the precinct level but may be large enough to use in a city wide 
model.12 
                                                 
9 David Weisburd et al., “Enhancing Informal Social Controls to Reduce Crime: Evidence from a Study of 
Crime Hot Spots,” Prevention Science 22, no. 4 (2021): pp. 509-522, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11121-020-
01194-4. 
10 Wilpen Gorr, Andreas Olligschlaeger, and Yvonne Thompson, “Short-Term Forecasting of 





Predictive policing has been used in other ways besides using geospatial analysis 
to identify crime hot spots. It has also been used to identify major criminal actors and 
groups attempting to take them off the street.13 This technique, called “focused 
deterrence” tests the hypothesis that by going after repeat offenders the overall crime will 
drop in the surrounding area.14 These studies were conducted in the cities of Newark, 
New Jersey, Chicago, Illinois, and Glasgow, Scotland. The Newark study measured the 
number of weekly gunshot wound incidents. The Chicago study measured homicides and 
gang related incidents. The Glasgow study measured violent crime. The Newark study 
resulted in no statistically significant reduction in weekly gunshot wound incidents. The 
Chicago study resulted in a statistically significant 32% decline in homicides. The 
Glasgow study resulted in a 65% decline in weapon carrying among select individuals.15 
The Newark study additionally evaluated whether when the focused deterrence 
methodology was implemented the crime then bled into surrounding areas and away from 
where it had been mainly occurring. The study did not report any crime shifts into 
surrounding areas.16 Research in different studies have shown however that combining 
focused deterrence with complementary strategies works more successfully than just 
simply focused deterrence alone.17  
Another form of predictive policing is the “pulling levers” strategy. The pulling 
levels strategy is applied when the police and leadership determine what particular group 
                                                 
13 Anthony A. Braga, David Weisburd, and Brandon Turchan, “Focused Deterrence Strategies Effects on 







or gang related crime they want to specifically focus on. Once they identify the key 
offenders in the area, they use a variety of authorities to stop the individuals from 
continuing the behavior.18 This strategy was used in Boston in 1996 and had success 
lowering youth homicide. The predictive policing work was used to identify the key 
offenders of the crimes and a 63% decrease in monthly youth homicides was seen 
afterwards.19 Further analysis of this study has led researchers to believe however that the 
decrease in youth homicides in this time frame transpired amongst a nationwide decrease. 
It is also noted that there were other substantive policy changes in this time frame that 
could have impacted the youth homicide statistics: increased number of police, increasing 
prison population, and the end of the crack-cocaine epidemic, amongst others.20  
Another predictive policing model that has been used in the past is the “Repeat 
Victimization” model. The repeat victimization model focuses not on geographic areas or 
“hot spots” but rather specific individuals or businesses. Previous studies have found that 
a third of burglaries in hot spot areas are of repeat businesses or addresses.21 Further 
more, research has also found that businesses or addresses near other repeat victims are 
likely to be victimized.22 Another predictive policing model that has been used in the past 
are univariate methods, random walk and naïve lag. Both of these only requires a single 
variable that uses past data to predict future data. However, these method suffers when 
working with time-series data or seasonal disruptors, both of which apply to crime 
                                                 
18 Ibid; Anthony A. Braga and David L. Weisburd, “Systematic Review of the Effects of ‘Pulling Levers’ 




21 Ibid; Elizabeth R Groff and Nancy G La Vigne, “Forecasting the Future of Predictive Crime 
Mapping,” Crime Prevention Studies 13 (2002): pp. 29-57. 
22 Ibid 
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patterns.23 An alternative predictive policing model is the leading indicator methods. 
These use multiple independent variables to predict the value of the dependent variable. 
The leading indicators should focus on specific features that could reasonably impact the 
dependent variable.24 A more complex geospatial predictive policing approach is using 
the Raster GIS methods. This method has been used to find the risk index for residential 
burglary based on having vacant homes or buildings nearby.25  
  
                                                 
23 Ibid; Elizabeth R Groff and Nancy G La Vigne, “Forecasting the Future of Predictive Crime 




3 Data and Methods 
 The data used in this study is from the New York Police Department’s online data 
portal. The data is from the years 2000 to 2019 and gives the total number of seven major 
felonies for each of the years and by each individual police precinct in New York City. 
This study is specifically focusing on the Manhattan District Attorney so the data was 
subset to include only police precincts that are in Manhattan and fall under his authority. 
The subsetting was done manually in Microsoft Excel by finding the police precincts that 
are in Manhattan on the New York Police Department website and keeping only those 
precincts in the Excel document.  
 There is seven distinct felonies that are examined in this study as well as the total 
of all of them. The distinct felonies are: Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter, Rape, 
Robbery, Felony Assault, Burglary, Grand Larceny and Grand Larceny of Motor Vehicle.  
 
 The model that was used to conduct the data analysis of the implementation of the 
Crime Strategies Unit by Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance is the Regression 
Figure 1 
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Discontinuity Design (RDD). This design is used to understand the casual effect of the 
implementation of the Crime Strategies Unit in Manhattan. DA Vance implemented this 
unit in mid-2010. The two different time periods that are analyzed are 2000 through 2010 
and 2011 through 2019. This decision was made to compare full years with the Crime 
Strategies Unit compared to years when it either hadn’t yet been created or a partial year 
with the unit. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the number of arrests each year for each 
distinct crime.  
  
The data was broken into different data frames by crime so they could be 
analyzed individually. Additionally, covariate data was added to the RDD model to 
account for possible trends that may have contributed to the crime rate in New York City. 
Figure 2 
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A dummy variable for the “Stop and Frisk” policy has been added with “1” signaling 
when it was in effect and “0” signaling after it had been declared unconstitutional and the 
New York Police Department significantly curtailed the use of it.26 The “Stop and Frisk” 
policy in New York City was ruled unconstitutional in 2013 and the use of it sharply fell 
off after. Additionally, the national arrest rate for all offenses was added as covariate data 
to adjust for the national trend in crime. This data was added as the number of arrests per 
100,000 individuals.27  
  
                                                 
26 Taahira Thompson, “NYPD's Infamous Stop-and-Frisk Policy Found Unconstitutional,” The Leadership 
Conference Education Fund, March 15, 2019, https://civilrights.org/edfund/resource/nypds-infamous-stop-
and-frisk-policy-found-unconstitutional/. 
27 “Arrests by Offense, Age, and Race,” Arrests by offense, age, and race, accessed July 4, 2021, 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr.asp?table_in=2&selYrs=2000&rdoGroups=1&rdoData=r. 
(Arrests by offense, age, and race n.d.) 
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4 Results 
 The results for the Regression Discontinuity Design are broken down into distinct 
graphs and tables for each of the separate felonies as well as the total number of felony 
crime arrests.  The initial null hypothesis for each of the felony crimes as well as the total 
is that there is no difference between pre-2010 and before the Crime Strategies Unit 
compared to post-2010 and after the Crime Strategies Unit was created, see Figure 3. 
 
 
4.1 Murder Arrests 
 The Regression Discontinuity Design for the Murder Arrests from 2000 to 2019 
was run with the Stop and Frisk and the National Arrest Rate included as covariates. 
Figure 4 shows the Regression Discontinuity Design with the break at 2010, which is 
when the Crime Strategies Unit was implemented by District Attorney Cyrus Vance.  
H0: Treatment Effect = 0 
HA: Treatment Effect  ≠ 0 
Figure 3 
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The Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) for the Murder Arrests model was 
39.20 which was significant at p = .009. The null hypothesis can thus be rejected, 
showing that the positive LATE value is statistically significant.  
 
4.2 Rape Arrests 
 The Regression Discontinuity Design for the Rape Arrests from 2000 to 2019 was 
run with the Stop and Frisk and the National Arrest Rate included as covariates. Figure 5 
shows the Regression Discontinuity Design with the break at 2010, which is when the 
Crime Strategies Unit was implemented by District Attorney Cyrus Vance.  
Figure 4 
 14 
 The LATE for the Rape Arrests model was 132.63 which was significant at p = 
1.0414 x 10-5. The null hypothesis can be rejected, showing that the positive LATE value 
is statistically significant. 
 
4.3 Robbery Arrests 
The Regression Discontinuity Design for the Robbery Arrests from 2000 to 2019 
was run with the Stop and Frisk and the National Arrest Rate included as covariates. 
Figure 6 shows the Regression Discontinuity Design with the break at 2010, which is 
when the Crime Strategies Unit was implemented by District Attorney Cyrus Vance. 
Figure 5 
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The LATE for the Robbery Arrests model was 395.5 which was not significant at 
p = .066. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected, showing that the positive LATE value is 
not statistically significant.  
 
4.4 Assault Arrests 
The Regression Discontinuity Design for the Assault Arrests from 2000 to 2019 
was run with the Stop and Frisk and the National Arrest Rate included as covariates. 
Figure 7 shows the Regression Discontinuity Design with the break at 2010, which is 
when the Crime Strategies Unit was implemented by District Attorney Cyrus Vance. 
Figure 6 
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The LATE for the Assault Arrests model was 167.77 which was significant at p = 
.005. The null hypothesis can be rejected, showing that the positive LATE value is 
statistically significant.  
 
4.5 Burglary Arrests 
The Regression Discontinuity Design for the Burglary Arrests from 2000 to 2019 
was run with the Stop and Frisk and the National Arrest Rate included as covariates. 
Figure 8 shows the Regression Discontinuity Design with the break at 2010, which is 
when the Crime Strategies Unit was implemented by District Attorney Cyrus Vance. 
Figure 7 
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The LATE for the Burglary Arrests model was -227.56 which was not significant 
at p = .1544. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected, showing that the negative LATE 
value is not statistically significant. 
 
4.6 Larceny Arrests 
The Regression Discontinuity Design for the Larceny Arrests from 2000 to 2019 
was run with the Stop and Frisk and the National Arrest Rate included as covariates. 
Figure 9 shows the Regression Discontinuity Design with the break at 2010, which is 
when the Crime Strategies Unit was implemented by District Attorney Cyrus Vance. 
Figure 8 
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The LATE for the Larceny Arrests model was -158.9 which was not significant at 
p = .8209. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected, showing that the negative LATE value 
is not statistically significant.  
 
 
4.7 Vehicular Larceny Arrests 
The Regression Discontinuity Design for the Vehicular Larceny Arrests from 
2000 to 2019 was run without the Stop and Frisk and the National Arrest Rate included as 
covariates. The model improved with the covariates not being included as he p-value with 
the covariates was .4055. Figure 10 shows the Regression Discontinuity Design with the 
break at 2010, which is when the Crime Strategies Unit was implemented by District 
Attorney Cyrus Vance. 
Figure 9 
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The LATE for the Vehicular Larceny Arrests model was 262.98 which was 
significant at p = .0075. The null hypothesis can be rejected, showing that the LATE 
value is statistically significant.  
 
4.8 Total Arrests 
The Regression Discontinuity Design for the Total Arrests from 2000 to 2019 was 
run with the Stop and Frisk and the National Arrest Rate included as covariates. Figure 
11 shows the Regression Discontinuity Design with the break at 2010, which is when the 
Crime Strategies Unit was implemented by District Attorney Cyrus Vance. 
Figure 10 
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The LATE for the Total Arrests model was 213.3 which was not significant at p = 






 The purpose of this study into predictive policing methods in New York City and 
specifically in Manhattan by District Attorney Cyrus Vance was to discover whether 
there was a relationship between the methodology and crime rates and if crime rates 
decreased as a result of the methodology being implemented. Overall, the results of the 
research were inconclusive with the Murder, Rape, Assault, and Vehicular Larceny 
arrests having statistically significant differences between before and after 
implementation with the arrests increasing post-implementation. Meanwhile, the 
Robbery, Burglary, Larceny, and Total Arrests did not have statistically significant 
differences between the pre-implementation and post-implementation arrests. The null 
hypothesis was that there was no Treatment Effect between the two time periods (Figure 
2) and the null hypothesis was only rejected for some of the crimes and importantly not 
for the Total arrests. 
 The limitations of the research was constricted by the parameters that the 
Manhattan District Attorney had assigned to the predictive policy program. Further 
research that explores a jurisdiction that combines the “crime drivers” technique 
alongside a geospatial crime “hot spotting” technique would give further insight into 
using both of these methods in conjunction and if that leads to significant decrease in 
crime. Additionally, looking more closely into seasonal effects of policies would be a 
bigger step as police departments likely be able to pull more out of an analysis when 
broken down into months instead of years. This study was restricted by the data that was 
reported by the New York Police Department as data by year. 
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The policy implications of the study can be utilized to further inform public safety 
decision makers not only in Manhattan and New York City but other jurisdictions as 
well. The study controlled for the use of “Stop and Frisk” which was declared 
unconstitutional in New York City in  2013 and the national arrest rate for all offenses. 
These were done to account for factors that may have played a role in the increase or 
decrease of arrests that the study looked into. After controlling for these variables, there 
was no significant evidence that the predictive policing methodology had a statistically 
significant effect in decreasing crime. This doesn’t necessarily mean that policy makers 
should discard the approach, but signifies the need to look deeper into the techniques and 
examine why there isn’t a significant decrease in crime after having implemented the 
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